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It has also been suggested that the doctrine does not apply when there
is direct evidence as to the cause of the accident."
While courts in other states have frequently permitted plaintiffs to
establish a cause of action in certain types of explosion cases by a reliance
upon the res ipsa doctrine,"M there had previously been little support for
such reliance in Ohio. It may be that the effect of the principal case will
be to extend the use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in Ohio to this
type of case. R.L.R.
SALES-TORTS-MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY FOR SALE OF
UNFIT FOOD
Plaintiff's intestate purchased a can of corned beef from his neigh-
borhood grocer and ate a part of it for his supper. By midnight he
was seriously ill, and he died the following morning. The coroner's
certificate stated that an autopsy revealed that death was the result
of ptomaine poisoning caused by eating canned meat. The can of meat
was packed by a South American company, but was distributed by the
defendant under its own name. The court held that violation of a penal
statute covering the sale of unwholesome provisions was negligence
per se, that the statute set up an absolute standard, and it was no defense
that the defendant exercised a high degree of care and was free from
negligence. Plaintiff had only to prove that the meat was sold under
the defendant's name and that the death was caused because the meat
in the can was unfit.'
The problem of who shall be liable for the sale of unfit food has
long been before the courts. They have experienced no difficulty in
holding the retailer liable. Since the thirteenth century it has been
recognized that one who sells food for human consumption is liable in
tort for any injury caused by unfitness of the food sold.' The develop-
ment of the doctrine that one who sells food impliedly warrants to the
purchaser that the food sold is wholesome gave to the claimant a choice
of remedies.' He could sue either in tort for the negligence of the seller
or in contract for the breach of the implied warranty. Public policy
was behind the formation of these rules since the ordinary consumer
"See Cleveland R. Co. v. Sutherland, iS5 Ohio St. z62, z64, 152 N.E. 726, 727
(3926).
'OFor discussion of cases on this point see, z5 C. J. 2o, See. 38. Also see notes
in 8 A.L.R. 500, 23 A.L.R. 484, 39 L.R. ioo6 and 56 A.L.R. 593.
'Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 11o F. (zd) 970, (3940). This case was decided in
a Federal District Court in New York, but the Ohio law was the basis for the decision.
a Si Hen. III Stat. 6, (iz66); Burnby v. Bollett, 16 M.&,V. 644, (1847).
' Sinclair v. Hathaway, 57 Mich. 6o, 23 N.W. 459 (1885); Fairbank Canning Co. v.
Metzger, ix8 N.Y. 26o, 23 N.E. 372, 16 Am. St. Rep. 753 (x89o); Van Bracklin v.
Fonda, 12 Johns. (N.Y.) 468 (O8SI)i 3 BL. COMM. 165.
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did not have the means of examination available to the retailer and
had to rely on the latter's integrity.4 But it was not until the middle
of the nineteenth century that the consumer was given a right of action
directly against the manufacturer, since heretofore the lack of privity
between the manufacturer and the consumer had stood in the way.
The courts overlooked the lack of privity in the negligence cases and
if the plaintiff could establish a claim based on the actual negligence
of the manufacturer he could recover.' This was one of the first excep-
tions to the general rule which allowed a manufacturer to escape lia-
bility to the ultimate consumer for its negligence where the consumer
purchased from a middleman.' This is the rule today in many of the
states.' But negligence is an elusive charge to prove and difficulty in
obtaining proof often prevents the injured person from establishing his
claim. In those states which apply the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the
claimant's task is made easier.8 Because the claim is necessarily based
on facts within the exclusive control of the manufacturer a p4rma facie
case of negligence is presumed against the manufacturer. This puts the
burden on the defendant to rebut the presumption and prove its freedom
from negligence.
There is a group of states which applies the implied warranty of
fitness doctrine.' Until recently the courts refused to waive the require-
ment of privity of contract between the manufacturer and the person
suing for breach of the warranty. But the recent trend of decisions in
the food cases is to relax, and in many cases abolish, the requirement.'
"Van Bracklin v. Fonda, supra, note 35 Wright v. Hart, iS Wend. (N.Y.) 449
(1837).5 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852); Norton v. Sewall,
1o6 Mass. 143, 8 Am. Rep. z98 (1870)5 Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 5±5,
5z S.E. s~z (19o5)j Ketterer v. Armour & Co., zoo F. 32Z (i912)i Boyd v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, 53z Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 8o (1914).
" Hu-t v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., izo F. 865 (1903)5 See Winterbottom
x. V.r/iht, 10 M. & W. 109 (184z), for a statement of the general rule.
'Munaker v. Supplee-Willis-Jones Milk Co., x5z Pa. Sup. Ct. 76, Atl. 714 (937)i
(i' ,) Dlk %. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., ISo S.C. 436, x86 S.E. 383 (1936)5
,,rurn %,. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 2o5 N.C. 213, 171 S.E. 78 (1933); Flora Ash v.
Cbild. Dning Hall Co., Z31 Mass. 86, 5zo N.E. 396, 4 A.L.R. 1556 (1918).
'Blevins v. Raleigh Coca-Cola Bottling 'Works, - W.Va.-, 3 S.E. (zd) 627
(1939)5 Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., - W.Va. -, z S.E. (2d) 898
(1935) Murphy v. Yeungling Dairy Products Co., 34 D.&C. (Pa. Com. P1.) 355 (1938);
E1snbei s v. Payne, 42 Ariz. z6z, 25 P. (2d) z62 (1933); Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas,
z36 Ky. 6S4, 33 SV.W (zd) 701 (5930); Goldman & Frieman Bottling Co. v. Sindall,
14o Md. 4$, 117 A. S66 (9zz).
'Catini v. Swift & Co., 255 Pa. 5z, 95 A. 931 (1915); Ward Baking Co. v.
Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (59zS); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Shop
Co., 14 Cal. (zd) Z72, 93 P- (zd) 799 (1939).
"Ketterer v. Armour & Co., supra, note 5; Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189
Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 38Z, 17 A.L.R. 649 (592o); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash.
6zz, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
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In Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino" the court held that the warranty
from the manufacturer to the retailer was for the benefit of the ultimate
consumer and allowed the latter to sue for the breach of the warranty
on the theory of third party beneficiary. Other courts have abolished
completely the necessity for privity by holding that the warranty attaches
to the article sold and runs with the article and becomes available to
the person injured by the article.' 2 A similar result is obtained by some
courts by imposing the tort doctrine of liability without fault on the
manufacturer.' 3 Thus whether the plaintiff wishes to use the warranty
doctrine'" or the liability without fault doctrine the result will be the
same.
In those states having statutes 5 which cover the sale of unwholesome
provisions the problem of liability is solved much more simply. There
is no need to imply a warranty or prove negligence. The Ohio statute"0
has been so construed that a violation of it imposes an absolute liability
on the one who violates it,' 7 and no privity of contract need be shown
by the plaintiff. Thus in states such as Ohio, which have both the
statute and the warranty of fitness doctrine, the consumer has a rela-
tively simple case to prove in order to recover for an injury. Under
the statute, negligence is conclusively presumed, and under the warranty
doctrine there is no need to consider negligence.
Some courts have distinguished cases involving canned and pack-
aged foods from those involving food sold in bulk.'" This distinction
is based on the impossibility of inspecting sealed foods before purchase.
But this is not a valid distinction because very few members of the
general public are able to properly ascertain the fitness of food even
when open. The rule has little, if any, following today.
SSupra, note 9.
'Kneiss v. Armour & Co., 134. Ohio St. 432, 17 N.E. (zd) 734, ig A.L.R. 1348
(1938), Drock v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 61 Ohio App. 791, 2z N.E. (zd)
54-7 (1939); Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co., 172 N.C. 33, 87 S.E. 9S8 (iqx6);
Catini v. Swift & Co., supra, note 9i Boyd v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, sapraq note 5,
16 OHIO JURISPRUDENCE 168.
" Catini v. Swift & Co., supra, note 9; Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman,
s6o Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 (2914); 4 IowA L. BULL. 102.
"Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, supra, note 9; Gauder v. Canton Provisions Co., 17
Ohio L. Abs. 329 (1934); Kneiss v. Armour & Co., supra, note 12; Drock v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 2z; Kolberg v. Central Fruit & Grocery Co., 37
Ohio App. 64, x74 N.E. 144. (2930).
1 California, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee and West Virginia all have statutes similar to that of Ohio.
"'OHIO G.C. 1276o.
17 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Hughes, 131 Ohio St. So, 3 N.E. (zd) 415S,
6 Ohio Op. 264 (2936); Canton Provisions Co. v. Gauder, 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E.
634, 3 Ohio Op. 8z (935).
'SMazetti v. Armour & Co., supra, note io; Crigger v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works,
23z Tenn. 545, 179 S.W. I55 (1915).
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The modern rule seems to be to impose some kind of liability without
fault upon the manufacturer so that he will exercise greater care in the
manufacture of articles of food for human consumption. If the public
is to be protected from inefficient and unsanitary methods of production
some manner of penalizing the manufacturers for their mistakes is
necessary. Dean Pound expressed his ideas on the subject some years
ago when he said that the best way to protect the public is to impose
liability without fault upon the manufacturers of food.' 9 Only in this
way will the manufacturers continue to improve methods of production.
G.O.A.
WILLS
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE ADMISSION TO PROBATE OF A
WILL - EXECUTION - SIGNING IN THE ATTESTATION
CLAUSE AS SIGNING AT THE END UNDER GENERAL CODE
SEC. 10504-3.
An instrument dated April 16, 1927 was admitted to probate on
June 9, 193o, as the last will and testament of W. L. Eakins. The
signature of the testator, Eakins, appeared only in the attestation clause.
On July 14, 1938, another instrument, dated November 15, 1926,
was offered to probate as the last will and testament of Eakins, and
was refused on the ground that the 1927 instrument had already been
admitted. On appeal a collateral attack was made on the admission of
the later instrument, on the ground that the probate court had no juris-
diction to admit to probate an instrument not signed at the end, as
required by the Ohio statute.' The court sustained the attack, and held
that the jurisdiction of the probate court is limited to wills as prescribed
by the Constitution and statute; and where it is apparent on the face
of the instrument that such instrument does not even purport to be a
will, the probate court has no jurisdiction to admit it as such. In re
AMatter of Will of Eakins.2
The right to make a testamentary disposition is purely of statutory
creation, and is available only upon compliance with the requirements of
the statute.3 A usual provision and one which appears in the Ohio statute,
is that a "will must be signed at the end." The apparent reason for
this rule is to insure identity of the instrument, and to prevent fraudulent
" Pjund, The End of the Law (1914) 27 HARv. L. REv. 195, Z33-
OHio G.C. sec. 10504-3.
263 Ohio App. z6S, z6 N.E. (7d) z9, 16 Ohio Op. 586 (z939).
3Tyrrel's Case, 17 Ariz. 418, 153 Pac. 767, 768 (i915).
